petroleo-gas livro sandoval

LIVRO: Petróleo e Gás Natural para Executivos (Sandoval Amui)


Sandoval Amui


O petróleo, o gás natural e seus derivados têm grande relevância para todas as nações, sejam produtoras ou apenas consumidoras desses produtos. Receitas provenientes da produção e despesas com a importação dos mesmos influem na balança de pagamentos, nas políticas governamentais, no desenvolvimento econômico e, em última análise, na vida de todos os cidadãos de um país.

Um aspecto estratégico da indústria petrolífera é a posse de reservas, para que a nação possa usufruir dos benefícios dessa riqueza sem o ônus inerente à dependência de suprimento externo. Para contar com essa matéria prima, petróleo e gás natural, para além de ser contemplado pela natureza, o país tem de empregar meios que, de um lado, exigem pesados investimentos e sofisticada tecnologia, e de outro, impõem grandes riscos financeiros, operacionais e mercadológicos. Esses meios constituem o segmento de exploração e produção de hidrocarbonetos da indústria petrolífera, cuja visão técnica é o objeto deste livro.

ISBN: 9788571932272
1a. Edição – 2010
Formato 18×25 cm, BROCHURA – 276 páginas

Sandoval Amui é Senior Counsel no escritório do Rio de Janeiro de Tauil & Chequer Advogados. Sua atuação concentra-se nos aspectos técnicos, econômicos, estratégicos e jurídicos de casos relativos a negócios com energia, especialmente projetos de engenharia, incluindo economia e negociação contratual. Anteriormente, o Sandoval trabalhou durante 30 anos na Petrobras, a maior empresa industrial do Brasil, como engenheiro, gerente e negociador internacional. Trabalhou também como sócio sênior da Expetro Consultoria, onde assessorou empresas energéticas nacionais e internacionais no Brasil e ao redor do mundo.


LIVRO: Petróleo e Gás para Advogados e Negociadores (Sandoval Amui)

Petróleo e Gás Natural – Sandoval Amui (8537510432)

Sandoval Amui é Senior Counsel no escritório do Rio de Janeiro de Tauil & Chequer Advogados. Sua atuação concentra-se nos aspectos técnicos, econômicos, estratégicos e jurídicos de casos relativos a negócios com energia, especialmente projetos de engenharia, incluindo economia e negociação contratual. Anteriormente, o Sandoval trabalhou durante 30 anos na Petrobras, a maior empresa industrial do Brasil, como engenheiro, gerente e negociador internacional. Trabalhou também como sócio sênior da Expetro Consultoria, onde assessorou empresas energéticas nacionais e internacionais no Brasil e ao redor do mundo.


2013: The Rise And Fall Of Brazilian Billionaire Eike Batista

by Mac Margolis – THE DAILY BEAST

One day, some 30 years ago, before the trophy wife and the floodlights, when a berth on the Forbes billionaires list was still a moon shot, Eike Batista was restless. At age 23, he’d had enough of Europe and the golden cage he’d spent his childhood in, and decided to move back to his native Brazil to make something of himself. The engineering school dropout had sold corned beef to Africa and brokered some Brazilian diamonds with mixed success. But Batista wanted something bigger.

He found it in a glossy photomagazine with a feature on the Amazon gold rush. “I knew that’s where I wanted to be,” he said in an interview two years ago. His father, Eliezer Batista, a legendary Brazilian mining executive, was livid. “I’m going to give you an idiot’s diploma!” he exploded, pounding a fist on the dining room table when he learned his son had bought into a rainforest gold mine. They didn’t talk to each other for the next 10 years, but the young Batista didn’t back down. “This was alluvial gold,” he said. “It was idiot-proof.”

For the next three decades, versions of that scene—the parental scolding, doubling down against withering odds, a daredevil’s self-confidence, a choirboy’s belief in “idiot-proof” assets—would loop over and over again through Batista’s career. If his father doubted him, Batista’s mother pumped him up. “She called me Goldesel,” he said, recalling the Grimm brothers’ fairytale about the good luck donkey that dropped gold pieces from its mouth.

With his bullet-proof ego and camera-ready smile, Batista parlayed his stakes in Amazon gold into cash and then into cachet to leverage ever bigger ventures. In a little less than a generation, he’d rebooted himself into this emerging nation’s alpha investor, shedding the image of pampered playboy to become the world’s eighth richest man, courted by investors and politicians alike.

When he was king, everyone—Anglo American, Pimco, Black Rock, the Schlumberger Group—wanted a piece of Eike (pronounced Ike), as Brazilians know him. His emerging mining and energy conglomerate rocketed to the top of the São Paulo stock market. Cordial and bullish, with a tropical swagger to his step, Batista was not just a Brazilianaire but an emblem of Brazil itself, a sleeper country now aggressively on the make. Some two million people followed his Twitter feed.

It was only fitting that Batista’s fall would be just as spectacular. On Oct. 30, Batista’s signature oil and gas company, OGX, filed for bankruptcy. Once the bluest chip on the São Paulo bourse, worth $35 billion in 2011, OGX is trading at a few cents a share. His mining, logistics and energy companies have been taken over by foreign investors. The net value of the entire cluster of Batista’s businesses, each branded with a letter X, a symbol for the multiplication of wealth, has turned to dust.

Minority stakeholders, who eagerly hitched their wagons to Eike’s rising star, are scrambling to court to recover their crumbling investments. The policy whizzes in Brasilia who reveled in the new national business icon are mulling over how to retrieve the $2.9 billion they loaned to Batista at sweetheart rates through the publicly subsidized development bank. Reporters are no longer invited to helicopter out to the future site of his superport. Batista’s patented pink tie and Cheshire cat smile no longer light up the Rio night. His Twitter feed has gone silent.

Not surprisingly, the slow motion fall of Batista’s holdings has become this year’s rolling headline in Brazil, and beyond. Yet many savvy investors saw trouble coming two years back, when the value of Batista’s corporate portfolio ballooned in the stock market even before he had fetched a single barrel of oil from the ocean floor or loaded his first ton of coal. Yet in road show after road show, he talked up a storm. The massive Porto Açu, a superport and planned city complex north of Rio, may have been little more than a sea bridge connected to a bald building site, but Eike managed to draw world class partners on board.

Investors were impressed with his grasp of details and 30,000-foot perspective on logistics and economies of scale. They winked at his bare knuckle business style and his reputation as a corporate raider, poaching alpha executives from Petrobras, Vale and other mega companies, with lavish pay and stock options. In vexatious Latin America, they knew that a blue chip ego was an asset. “I see myself as a knight of efficiency. If there is something that isn’t efficient, I’m going to break it down,” he said. “The Google guys do that. Steve Jobs was famous for that. They look for ways to make life more user-friendly and that’s how I see myself.”

In time, as production targets were missed and delayed, skepticism stirred. Was Batista all smoke and mirrors? Still, he talked a good game. “Batista doesn’t think big, he thinks huge,” said Armínio Fraga, an investor and former Brazilian Central Bank president, who briefly held a stake in one of the X companies. The joke in the financial trenches was that after Bill Gates, no one had made so much money off of PowerPoint. Eike waved away the Cassandras and spun his dedication to “fundamentals.” “These are not subprime mortgages,” he said of his portfolio that stretched from shipyards to oil rigs. “This is productive investment.” After all, he sat on mountains of ultra high grade Colombian coal and his oil was in shallow offshore wells, not the deepwater crude that Brazil had just discovered a daunting four miles below the surface of the Atlantic. “These are idiot-proof assets,” he said, repeating the blue skies refrain he’d coined a quarter century earlier.

Batista’s eccentricity also helped inflate the X bubble. He was a rarity in a country where the superrich shun publicity or pretend they are like everyone else. Unashamed about his wealth—made from sweat not speculation, he claimed—he worked at leveraging fortune into celebrity. Back in the nineties, when he was already fabulously rich, Batista was known—and often lampooned—as the heat-seeking scion of a top Brazilian mining official and the husband of a carnival queen. Mr. Luma de Oliveira, they called him, after his supernova wife, whom he later divorced. Other moguls might collect Picassos. Batista, a onetime powerboat racer, favored fast cars and yachts. For years, he kept a Lamborghini and a silver Mercedes-Benz SLR McLaren in his living room.

Even when giving, Batista went over the top. He paid over $550,000 at a benefit auction for the jersey of national football hall-of-famer, Ronaldo, and brought Madonna to tears by pledging $7 million to her charity, Success For Kids. When physicians from a struggling public hospital in Rio needed an MRI machine, Batista wrote them a $1.5 million check and shelled out another $500,000 to install it. “I was floored,” says neurosurgeon Paulo Niemeyer, who had contacted Batista for the event.

Every tycoon has a shtick but in business, Batista was all brass knuckles. By the mid-2000s he had shed the showboat wife (reportedly payingPlayboy to kill a photo spread of her) and started plunging money into multimillion dollar plays in energy, infrastructure and mining, scooping up properties and resources. He boldly claimed to be sitting on $2.3 trillion in assets, including top grade coal, gold, iron ore and a potential 10 billion barrels of oil.

Of course, living in floodlights had its inconveniences. Last year, when Batista’s 20-year-old son Thor, driving a fancy gull wing Mercedes Benz, struck and killed a cyclist on a Rio highway, the media frenzy turned the tragedy into a tropical version of Bonfire of the Vanities. Feeding the script were the facts that Thor was on his father’s payroll, had racked up a fistful of fines for traffic violations, and that the victim was a bricklayer. Batista’s lawyers blamed the accident on the cyclist’s imprudence but, quickly agreed to pay a generous, undisclosed fee to the victim’s family. In June, Thor was convicted of involuntary manslaughter.

Still, Eike was just the kind of benefactor Brazil ached for: superrich, conscientious and an enthusiastic backer of the arts and worthy causes. “The Eike story played well,” says Alberto Ramos, an emerging market analyst at Goldman Sachs. “There was a narrative that made him more magical, a symbol of the new Brazil, a big emerging, global player.”

Batista’s image got a material bump in early 2012, when his wells in the vaunted Tubarão field, in the southeast Atlantic, started pumping their first barrels of crude. By March, the company had raised about $500 in the bond market, halting a worrying slide in share prices. His cluster of Xs was Brazil’s hottest buy on the bourse. Forbes lifted him to eighth place on its roster of fat cats.

But the expected offshore oil gusher never happened. As it turned out, OGX had vastly overstated its oil reserves. By August 2013, the company announced its prize cache was producing just 17,000 barrels a day, about a third of the yearend target. Investors bolted and by late October, with OGX bleeding top executives and trading at pennies per share, Batista filed for bankruptcy.

Soaring success followed by collapse is nothing new to the business world. Yet Batista’s debacle turned heads. For many Latin America watchers, the fall of this entrepreneurial wunderkind was a body blow to Brazil itself. Not only had a big man stumbled, but the country he so daringly represented also seemed diminished by his woes. After all, authorities in Brasilia had made a point of touting Eike as the new face of Brazilian business, a mogul who took risks but also worked closely with the government to boost national development. Batista was a frequent guest of president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. “He deserves our respect,” said Lula’s successor, president Dilma Rousseff, posing alongside the favored tycoon, both dressed in matching oilman’s overhauls on a deep sea rig.

Batista’s success stoked patriotism. Here, after all, was a homegrown mogul, who thrived in a market dominated by giant state oil companies and multinational majors, like Chevron and Exxon. “There was a deliberate effort to forge a national champion,” says former finance minister Mailson da Nóbrega. “Eike was drafted into the role.”

He was also a Cinderella story for the media, eager for a popular idol who didn’t wear football cleats or strut the catwalks. A national newsmagazine splashed him on its cover in a photo montage wearing a beret and a Chinese work jacket: “Eike Xiaoping” read the cover line. The National Development Bank, BNDES, gave him generous loans subsidized by taxpayers.

That deference might explain the eagerness to overlook some of Batista’s failings. “Among energy experts there was plenty of talk about how Eike was overselling his hand, but no one said anything in public,” says Jean-Paul Prates, chief of Expetro, an oil and gas consultancy. “Everyone likes a winner and no one wanted to say the king had no clothes.” The result, says Prates, was “the biggest sham in the country’s recent economic history.”

Not that Batista was conniving to play investors or that Brazilian officials groomed him to lure foreign capital. “Batista was no Mike Milliken [the junk bond trader, convicted of securities racketeering]. This was not Enron, where a company was deliberately defrauding the markets,” says Nóbrega. “The problem was a failure of corporate governance. Eike was allowed to operate without the proper financial anchors.”

In some ways, this was a disaster waiting to happen. Brazil rightly prides itself for having kept tight reins on consumer credit and for its vigilant capital market, virtues that helped the country avoid the bubbles that took down the global financial markets. But the long-sheltered economy is just getting used to the rigors of the globalized market—not least in the oil business, which in Brazil is dominated by a single, state owned giant, Petrobras.

“Brazilian capital markets have little experience overseeing private players,” says Prates. The same goes for the oil and gas regulator, the National Petroleum Agency, which lacks the technical expertise to vet discoveries or evaluate the commercial viability of wells. “Our market isn’t just young, it’s in its infancy,” says Prates. “This reflects poorly on Brazil, which comes off as an immature market. The next time there’s a public stock offering in the oil sector, investors are going to think twice.”

Others are not so sure. “The oil industry is risky business,” says Goldman Sachs’ Ramos. “Sometimes you drill and the wells come up dry. It happens and it’s not necessarily bad management.”

For Brazil, mercifully, the lasting damage may ultimately be limited. “The collapse of Batista’s conglomerate was a shock test for Brazil,” says Nobrega. “There was no earthquake in the markets. No banks are likely to go under. Years ago, a bankruptcy the size of Batista’s might have caused all hell to break lose, maybe even a credit crisis. That shows maturity.”

That may be a small comfort to the man who made and lost $28 billion in a heartbeat. But the fact that a giant fell but barely wobbled this country on the rise is already a victory of sorts.

REUTERS/Bruno Domingos

2013: Governo tem chance de evitar sangria da Petrobras no pré-sal


Rio de Janeiro – O governo tem nas mãos o poder de conjugar sucesso no primeiro leilão do pré-sal com mecanismos que evitem uma sangria no caixa da Petrobras, como o ritmo dos prazos de exploração e de desenvolvimento da produção do campo.

Ao dar as cartas para o leilão da maior descoberta de petróleo já realizada no Brasil, a presidente Dilma Rousseff decide nas próximas semanas entre arrecadar rapidamente e sem limites ou livrar a estatal de desembolsos imediatos e muito elevados.

A definição das regras no edital da licitação da área de Libra selará o destino de dezenas de bilhões de dólares da Petrobras, num momento em que a empresa já está comprometida com outras regiões do pré-sal, segundo especialistas do setor ouvidos pela Reuters.

O governo fará em outubro o primeiro leilão do pré-sal no âmbito do novo modelo de partilha da produção, pelo qual as empresas se comprometem a oferecer à União participação no volume de petróleo produzido no campo. Deve vencer disputa o consórcio que oferecer à União o maior volume da produção prevista no campo.

A legislação que rege o sistema de partilha no Brasil deixou em aberto parâmetros decisivos como a parcela mínima de petróleo a ser oferecida à União pelo vencedor do leilão, bônus de assinatura, conteúdo local, critérios para cálculos de royalties, programa exploratório mínimo e ritmo de produção do campo.

O que já se sabe e está previsto na lei 12.351 de 2010 é que a Petrobras será a operadora única e sócia das áreas licitadas, com no mínimo 30 por cento de participação. A regra obriga a estatal a acompanhar ofertas de consórcios vencedores, sejam quais forem e a quaisqueis valores e prazos, se não houver limites previstos nas normas.

Para o especialista Jean Paul Prates, da consultoria Expetro, Libra, uma área que pode ter entre 8 bilhões e 12 bilhões de barris recuperáveis de óleo, pode ser um bom negócio para a estatal, já que boa parte do trabalho exploratório já foi realizada e não seriam necessários investimentos pesados nesta etapa. Isso faria com que a estatal tivesse que realizar aportes em Libra na fase posterior, de desenvolvimento do campo.

Os desembolsos com o desenvolvimento da produção poderão ser calibrados, pois o governo também participará da definição de prazos mínimos, bem como poderá aprovar ou não planos apresentados pelos consórcios, segundo a lei.

A lei da partilha prevê ainda que a exploração das reservas ocorram de acordo com a capacidade de oferta de conteúdo local.

Se isso for seguido à risca, especialistas acreditam que as exigências de investimentos no pré-sal licitado não deverão ser de curto prazo.

“O mercado fala que é prejuízo para a Petrobras porque não entende que a indústria do petróleo é de longo prazo. Sair como operadora de uma área como essa é ótimo, porque a reserva –e uma enorme reserva– já está ali”, avalia Prates.

O plano atual de investimentos da Petrobras, sem contemplar Libra, é de 236 bilhões de dólares em cinco anos.

Agressividade asiática

Como o governo escolheu para estrear no regime de partilha uma área praticamente sem risco exploratório, o leilão deverá ter disputa acirrada e poderá levar empresas de qualquer parte do mundo a oferecer grandes lances em dinheiro se o bônus não for fixo.

É temido que empresas com grandes necessidades de abastecimento de petróleo, sobretudo as asiáticas, façam ofertas sem retorno comercial para ficar com a reserva, já que a prioridade delas é ter fonte de petróleo.

“A Petrobras tem compromisso com governança, com retorno aos investidores, mas nem todas as petroleiras passíveis de vencer o leilão têm”, afirmou o consultor Jorge Camargo, que predidiu a norueguesa Statoil no Brasil.

Por outro lado, disse ele, a fixação de um bônus pode evitar perdas no caixa da Petrobras, opinião compartilhada por Prates, da consultoria Expetro.

“Não fixando um bônus de assinatura o governo poderá permitir que ofertas agressivas em dinheiro possam eventualmente ofuscar a oferta em petróleo, o que poderá descaracterizar o leilão de partilha, cujo objetivo é justamente dar mais controle das reservas à União, e não dinheiro, e ainda forçar a Petrobras a acompanhar qualquer loucura”, disse Prates.


A diretora-geral da Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Bicombustíveis e Gás Natural (ANP), Magda Chambriard, afirmou na semana passada que haverá valor fixo para o bônus de assinatura.

Mas o ministro de Minas e Energia, Edison Lobão, disse à Reuters após a declaração de Magda que o valor poderá variar, sendo inclusive critério de desempate.

“Se o governo permitir um bônus muito elevado, a quantidade de óleo oferecida à União deverá diminuir… É uma antecipação da receita que pode afetar a Petrobras”, disse Camargo.

Na última quinta-feira (23), a ANP informou que o edital com as regras do leilão e do contrato de partilha ficaria pronto em 15 dias.

A ANP tem competência para elaborar e submeter ao Ministério de Minas e Energia minutas de editais e contratos dos leilões do pré-sal, cabendo à pasta encaminhar os documentos ao Conselho Nacional de Política Energética (CNPE).

Mas a palavra final sobre o conteúdo dos contratos será da presidente Dilma, com quem a diretora-geral da ANP se reuniu na véspera do anúncio da antecipação do leilão de novembro para outubro e da divulgação de estimativas revisadas para a área de Libra.

O geológo John Forman, ex-diretor da ANP, observou que vários pontos do leilão ainda não estão claros, como, por exemplo, se o governo vai limitar o valor dos bônus e se a Petrobras será coadjuvante nas propostas.

“Não sabemos qual será a estratégia da Petrobras. Resta saber se ela vai executar um programa exploratório que não é dela ou se ela apresentará sua própria proposta”, afirmou.


2013: Abertura do petróleo mexicano ao setor privado cria concorrente para Petrobras

Decisão mexicana de abrir a estatal de petróleo Pemex ao capital privado dificultará ainda mais a briga por investimentos da Petrobras

O Brasil ganhou um concorrente de peso no mercado de óleo e gás com a reforma energética do México, que vai abrir a estatal de petróleo Pemex ao capital privado, afirmam especialistas ouvidos pelo EL PAÍS. Segundo eles, a disputa por investimentos por parte da Petrobras ficará ainda mais acirrada, principalmente devido a uma fase de “menor internacionalização” da companhia.

Primeiro, foi o Senado mexicano, que aprovou, na última quarta-feira, a abertura da indústria dos hidrocarbonetos ao investimento de empresas privadas nacionais e estrangeiras. Menos de 24 horas depois, foi a vez da Câmara dos Deputados  – com 354 votos a favor e 134 contra – dar seu aval às modificações dos artigos 25, 27 e 28 da Constituição Mexicana, colocando fim a 75 anos de nacionalismo na indústria energética do país.

A decisão traz ainda um novo ingrediente à disputa entre Brasil e México pelo título de “queridinho” da região entre os investidores.

O economista e professor do programa de Energia da Universidade de São Paulo (USP) Edmilson Moutinho, por exemplo, afirma que a concorrência ao Brasil se dará até em áreas consideradas de menor rentabilidade, como as de reservas de gás de xisto.

A decisão traz ainda um novo ingrediente à disputa entre Brasil e México pelo título de “queridinho” da região entre os investidores

“O México já tem dutos de importação com os Estados Unidos e vai ser muito rápida a entrada de investimento norte-americano, mesmo que o resultado não seja tão rentável. Nosso leilão de xisto não atraiu ninguém”, observa Moutinho. “Eles têm uma porta do lado de casa, de um capital que não virá para o Brasil”, completa.

A proximidade com o mercado norte-americano também é destacada por Alan Fernandes, diretor-executivo do Banco Espírito Santo (BES) no Brasil e responsável pela atividade de “project finance” da instituição em nível global. Ele avalia que, além da proximidade física com os Estados Unidos, “o modus operandi mexicano também é muito mais próximo ao norte-americano que o brasileiro”.

“A tendência é um movimento da Pemex e de outras empresas com ações mais agressivas em outros mercados, e também na busca por recursos e parcerias com outras companhias.”

Segundo o professor Moutinho, o México volta também a ganhar terreno no mercado energético, após ter representado quase que uma exceção na onda de liberalização do setor na América Latina na década de 1990. Os mexicanos foram símbolo de um dos três modelos observados na região no período.

“O modelo mexicano não mudava. Havia apenas a perda de reservas e produção, e o modelo se manteve por tanto tempo graças à forte alta do preço do petróleo”, afirma. Os outros modelos citados pelo professor da USP eram o argentino, marcado pela privatização efetiva no governo do presidente Carlos Menem, e o brasileiro, intermediário entre os dois anteriores, pois conseguia atrair parceiros sem realizar a privatização da Petrobras, que é uma empresa estatal de economia mista.

Uma lei em 1997 instituiu a flexibilização do monopólio estatal do petróleo no Brasil. Com isso, teve início um cenário de maior competição no setor, com a Petrobras estabelecendo parcerias com empresas privadas nacionais e internacionais e intensificando o seu processo de internacionalização.

“Ponho minha mão no fogo de que o México não seguirá o modelo argentino. O que dá para esperar é um modelo parecido com o brasileiro. A Pemex não será privatizada, e vão abrir áreas que sejam mais desafiadoras do ponto de vista tecnológico”, completa.

A reforma mexicana estabelece uma margem de dois anos para que as empresas públicas descentralizadas – Pemex e a Comissão Federal de Eletricidade (CFE) – se convertam em “empresas produtivas do Estado”, um termo ambíguo que as conclama a serem mais competitivas e a adotar as melhores “práticas em nível internacional”.

Moutinho e Fernandes coincidiram em destacar ainda que uma parceria entre o Brasil e o México em energia teria sido mais proveitosa no passado, ante uma agenda mais internacionalizada da Petrobras. Hoje, o foco da estatal brasileira está no desafio de colocar de pé uma exploração economicamente viável do petróleo na camada pré-sal.

“Onde poderíamos tirar vantagem é na exploração offshore, com tecnologia e capital humano. Mas não temos dinheiro. Há dez anos seríamos grandes parceiros, mas, hoje, com o pré-sal, estamos nos desinternacionalizando”, diz o professor da USP. “Se fosse em outros tempos, a Petrobras estaria mais aberta à exploração e produção em outros mercados. Atualmente, ela olha com mais atenção o mercado interno”, complementa, por sua vez, o diretor-executivo do BES.

Jean-Paul Prates, diretor da consultoria Expetro no Rio de Janeiro, reforça a exceção mexicana em um passado recente de avanços. “O monopólio do México era total, da exploração de petróleo até o posto de gasolina. Era um prejuízo muito grande que o país carregava”, afirma.

Mas Prates acredita que o momento não deve ser de lamentações no Brasil, e sim, de adaptações. “É evidente que, de cara, há mais riscos de o México se tornar um competidor do que um parceiro. Mas lamentar isso seria idiota. O Brasil tem muito a ensinar para o México por tudo o que percorreu”, avalia.

Smartjob logo

2005: Expetro e Onip lançam banco de dados de currículos para o setor de óleo e gás

A Organização Nacional da Indústria do Petróleo (Onip) e a Smartpetro, empresa do Grupo Expetro, anunciaram nesta terça-feira (8/11) o lançamento oficial do Smartjob, site de recrutamento de mão-de-obra para o setor de óleo e gás. Segundo o diretor da Expetro, Jean Paul Prates, o Smartjob é um banco de dados de currículos de candidatos do nível técnico ao de pós-graduação. A idéia é atender necessidades específicas de empresas afins do setor, incluindo construção naval e mineração.

Para cadastrar o currículo, o candidato precisa preencher gratuitamente um formulário eletrônico no qual fornece todos os seus dados profissionais. O trabalho de triagem e checagem das informações é feito pela Gelre, empresa especializada em recursos humanos. O serviço é pago pelas empresas que precisam contratar mão-de-obra e precisam acessar o banco de dados. “A gente entendeu isso como um atendimento a duas grandes necessidades do setor: para quem procura trabalho e para quem oferece. A principal vantagem é que o Smartjob pode atender necessidades bem específicas, como, por exemplo, a de encontrar um engenheiro de petróleo com experiência no exterior, que já tenha embarcado e fale inglês. Para isso, basta a empresa apresentar todos esses requisitos que o site fornece os currículos que atendam aquelas características”, explicou Alfredo Renault, superintendente regional da Onip.

No primeiro ano de funcionamento como piloto, o Smartjob cadastrou 8 mil currículos, sendo pouco mais da metade de nível técnico. Segundo Prates, é possível atingir a marca de 20 mil registros em um prazo inferior a um ano. A empresa oferece três tipos de assinatura: anual, semestral e mensal. Entre os planos da empresa está o oferecimento do serviço de seleção dos candidatos, que deverá ser oferecido no médio prazo.


1999: JP Prates (Oil & Gas Journal) – Brazil’s Three Natural Gas Systems

After 50 years of state monopoly on oil and gas activities and of a secondary role for natural gas in the country`s energy mix, Brazil has finally started looking seriously at natural gas as a important alternative source of energy to help match expected rising demand.

Brazilian exploration and production efforts now target natural gas, pipeline projects proliferate throughout the nation`s territory, markets start to become a tangible reality, and regulations are expected to be modern and flexible. Apart from the well-known Bolivia-to-Brazil (BTB) pipeline, other important projects are gaining importance, such as developing the Northeast Brazil market and the Argentina-Brazil gas supply connection-not to forget the old dream of bring viability to the Amazon region gas reserves.

The new scenario for natural gas activities in Brazil is still under construction. However, it already gives positive signs to both investors and consumers. The perspectives are therefore extremely interesting.

This article defines, for the first time, three distinct natural gas systems within Brazil, pointing out the basic characteristics and indicators for each of them. It also outlines the approach that has been taken by the Brazilian government through its National Petroleum Agency (ANP) to regulate the natural gas sector in Brazil aiming at building a competitive market, with sound infrastructure and integrated with the other relevant systems with South America.


Full article at Oil & Gas Journal (08/09/1999): click here.


2002: BNA – Q&A – Expetro executive director Jean-Paul Prates

Expetro is a Rio de Janeiro-based oil, gas and energy consultancy. BNamericas spoke with executive director and partner Jean-Paul Terra Prates on sector perspectives for 2002.

By Joshua Mellars – Friday, March 15, 2002


BNamericas: What are the key issues facing the sector this year?

Terra Prates: I think the biggest issue will be the hegemonic, no longer monopolistic, situation that Petrobras has both on natural gas markets and fuels markets. Until now the opening has been good for everyone and good for Petrobras too. Now there is a little disagreeable part, like adolescence where you have to correct the child. The child is the opening itself, you have a new baby, everything is growing, it is learning things. Now comes the time where it has grown to a point where you have to correct some things.

BNamericas: What impact do you see the elections having on the sector?

Terra Prates: If you elect something linked to the continuation of this government, the first year of his administration will be correcting points where the present government failed and they are mainly concerned with regulation.

If an opposition government wins, then the same thing will happen. So in fact you are going in the same direction.

I do not believe any of the candidates, except the really radical ones, would go backwards on the opening, nobody would close the country again, or declare Petrobras a monopoly again. The consequences of the oil and gas opening are very clear and very beneficial in terms of the number of jobs, investment, royalties, increase in reserves, increase in production, perspectives of having natural gas in the [energy] mix in a more important way, and the emergence of new domestic regional companies. The pros are much more interesting and bigger than the cons in this process.

BNamericas: How would you gauge the interest level of investors, particularly in the upstream sector?

Terra Prates: It is cooler now. It had been very heated because of the expectations of the new frontier. When you look at the map, you look at the big coast, and you know there are deep-water offshore reserves and you say, wow, what a great big new place.

It was the new frontier two or three years ago. Now it is reality. The first step was the expectations: big blocks offshore, partnering with Petrobras. Now Petrobras has cash and it does not need a partner just to have a partner. If you do not have anything to offer you do not qualify to be a partner. It (Petrobras) has some of the areas and it has the cash to develop these areas….

There have not been any fantastic discoveries up until now. So this has helped to make people cooler. All this can change all of a sudden if we have a few discoveries. And because some of the deadlines of some of the blocks of the first round, for instance, and some of the partnership blocks end in August, I believe there will be commercial discoveries declared in the middle of the year. Companies prefer to defer as much as they can this declaration of commerciality because that implies a beginning of development.

BNamericas: What are your expectations for the upcoming bid round?

Terra Prates: One fact that is certain is that the fourth round will compete with farm outs. Because after three rounds in a row like that you have several people that took areas strategically just to put their flags in Brazil. You have several people who took 100% stakes in blocks that will not keep the 100%. These people are probably selling their participation and are searching for partners. So anybody who wants to increase their portfolio in Brazil will have to consider both opportunities. Should I farm in to something someone is selling or would it be better to go to the blocks in the fourth round?

BNamericas: What companies have the most interest in the round?

Terra Prates: The fourth round has a whole part of it that falls into a different category of blocks: inland blocks, onshore in basins that are not considered as attractive as the offshore basins. So there might be a different investor profile required for these blocks.

Some people see value in it, but I do not know what type of investor would take that right now. It depends on the situation of the market outside. Most of the independents were either bought by someone else or merged into larger companies, so now they have the profile to go offshore too. These were the companies that could be the candidates to drill onshore, Canadian companies, inland American companies, Australian companies, but we do not know if they will come.

BNamericas: So will there be less interest?

Terra Prates: These internal areas are an experience. I do not think [oil regulator] ANP expects a big boom on these areas. They are testing the hypothesis. They are putting one block here, one block there. They are testing, but probably they will have to create more incentives for these areas in the future. But at least they are testing.

Offshore is a different story. These are ultra deepwater blocks. They require very experienced operators and with a lot of capacity to risk money. So this is a totally different investor profile. The main areas of Campos, Santos and Espirito Santo are sold already. So again you are talking about blocks that can be quasi-marginal. Not marginal but different than the other portfolios that you had before. So it is a very crucial test this fourth round.

BNamericas: Are there any less explored areas that seem to have more potential?

Terra Prates: I think the equatorial margin is quite interesting. There is new information on the area around the equator. This is all offshore. This is a place that is worth exploring.


Matéria original:*A:_Expetro_executive_director_Jean-Paul_Terra_Prates